Can Bangladesh Withdraw from the US Bangladesh Reciprocal Trade Agreement? A Constitutional and Treaty Law Analysis

The Agreement on Reciprocal Trade between the United States and Bangladesh was signed on 9 February 2026. Its text, released by the U.S. Trade Representative, provides that for many Bangladeshi goods the United States will not apply the April 2025 reciprocal tariff, but for other originating goods the additional U.S. ad valorem tariff will be no higher than 19%, in addition to normal MFN duty. The agreement also contains a 60-day termination clause, an enforcement clause allowing the United States to reimpose the earlier reciprocal tariff under Executive Order 14257, and an entry-into-force clause requiring an exchange of written notifications certifying completion of applicable legal procedures. 

For Bangladesh, the real legal question is not whether the agreement was politically expedient at the time it was signed. The harder question is whether the agreement is constitutionally sustainable, internationally defensible, and still rational to maintain after the major changes in the U.S. tariff regime that followed. On that question, there are serious legal arguments that Bangladesh could either withdraw from, or seek judicial invalidation of, the agreement. These arguments are substantial, but they are not automatic; a court would still need to assess them carefully. 

Why the agreement has become controversial

The criticism starts with the structure of the bargain itself. Public reporting and the treaty text show that Bangladesh made broad market-access and regulatory commitments in exchange for a reduction of the U.S. reciprocal tariff from 20% to 19%, plus zero reciprocal tariffs on certain listed items. The agreement goes well beyond ordinary tariff concessions and includes commitments touching industrial goods, agriculture, services, labor, customs cooperation, security-sensitive technologies, and other policy areas. 

That breadth matters because Bangladesh’s Constitution does not treat external economic commitments as a free-floating executive matter detached from constitutional discipline. Article 25 requires the State to base its international relations on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and equality, and to respect the right of peoples to determine and build up their own economic and social systems by ways and means of their own free choice. Those words do not automatically invalidate every asymmetrical treaty. But they do provide a powerful constitutional lens through which a heavily one-sided trade arrangement may be scrutinized. 

The constitutional objection under Article 25

A core argument against the agreement is that it does not adequately protect the vital trade interests of Bangladesh, while imposing obligations that disproportionately advance U.S. commercial and strategic interests. The treaty text itself supports part of that concern. Bangladesh undertakes extensive tariff cuts for U.S. goods, accepts specific U.S. regulatory and approval pathways in several areas, commits to certain labor and services reforms, and even accepts provisions tied to export controls, sanctions cooperation, and restrictions on procurement of certain nuclear materials. 

From a constitutional perspective, the issue is not whether Bangladesh can ever enter a difficult bargain. It can. The issue is whether an agreement of this kind is consistent with a constitutional requirement that treaty relations rest on sovereignty, equality, and free economic choice. A court reviewing this question would likely ask whether the agreement preserves Bangladesh’s regulatory autonomy in a meaningful way, or whether it effectively binds core economic policy choices to external pressure. That is especially relevant where the bargain was struck in the shadow of threatened tariffs. 

The “fundamental change of circumstances” argument

A second major argument comes from Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which recognizes a narrow doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances. Article 62 does not permit withdrawal merely because a treaty later looks unattractive. The threshold is much higher: the change must relate to circumstances existing when the treaty was concluded, must not have been foreseen by the parties, must have formed an essential basis of consent, and must radically transform the obligations still to be performed. 

That threshold is demanding. But the Bangladesh agreement presents an arguable case because the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently struck down Trump’s sweeping global tariffs imposed under IEEPA, and U.S. Customs then stopped collecting those tariffs. At the same time, Trump announced a new 15% global tariff under a different legal authority. Reuters reported that this new 15% tariff was introduced specifically to replace the illegal IEEPA tariffs. 

If Bangladesh negotiated under the pressure of a harsher reciprocal-tariff threat, and that legal foundation later collapsed, Bangladesh can plausibly argue that the original commercial premise of the agreement has been materially altered. Put differently, if the United States could no longer lawfully rely on the old tariff weapon that drove negotiations, then the consideration underlying Bangladesh’s consent may have shifted in a way that was both fundamental and unforeseen. That does not guarantee a successful Article 62 argument, because treaty law applies the doctrine narrowly. But it is a serious point, not a rhetorical one. 

Why this VCLT argument is arguable but not automatic

It is important to stay precise here. Article 62 is not a simple “circumstances changed, so we can leave” rule. Bangladesh would still need to show that the changed tariff environment was an essential basis of its consent and that the shift radically transforms the burden of future obligations. The United States would likely respond that the agreement was always broader than the immediate tariff dispute and included market access, strategic alignment, and supply-chain cooperation that survive the collapse of the old IEEPA tariff regime. 

So the better legal position is not that withdrawal under Article 62 is unquestionably available. The better position is that the post-signature collapse of the old tariff regime gives Bangladesh a credible legal basis to reopen the validity and wisdom of continued adherence, especially when paired with the agreement’s own termination clause and its not-yet-effective status. 

Full powers and authority to sign

Another potentially strong argument concerns who had authority to negotiate and sign, and whether they were properly empowered. Under VCLT Article 7, a person is considered capable of representing a State for adopting or authenticating a treaty only if they produce full powers or if such authority is evident from the practice of the State or the circumstances. Under Article 8, an act relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a person without authority is without legal effect unless later confirmed by the State. 

Public reporting identified the Bangladeshi signatories as the Commerce Adviser and the National Security Adviser. That does not by itself establish invalidity. States can authorize such officials. But if the signatories lacked constitutionally or administratively proper authorization, or if no valid “full powers” existed, then the treaty’s legal footing becomes vulnerable. This is a factual question that would require disclosure of the instruments of authorization, cabinet approvals, and the internal file of negotiation authority. 

Internal law of fundamental importance: Articles 46, 144, and 145A

The stronger domestic-law challenge may lie in the Constitution itself. Article 144 states that the executive authority of the Republic extends to property, trade, and the making of contracts. That provision recognizes executive competence in trade-related matters. But it does not exhaust the constitutional process for treaty-making. Article 145A separately requires that all treaties with foreign countries shall be submitted to the President, who shall cause them to be laid before Parliament. 

That distinction matters. A government may negotiate and sign, but if the constitutional process for treaties requires submission to the President and laying before Parliament, non-compliance with that process may be legally significant. This is where VCLT Article 46 becomes relevant. Article 46 says a State may invoke violation of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties if the violated rule is of fundamental importance and the violation was manifest, meaning objectively evident to any State acting in good faith. 

So, if it is true that the agreement was negotiated and concluded without compliance with Article 145A, that is not a minor procedural quibble. It goes to the constitutional competence to bind Bangladesh internationally. The same is true if the President was not brought into the process in the manner the Constitution contemplates. That would not automatically make the treaty void in all settings, but it would provide a serious ground for domestic constitutional challenge and a potentially arguable ground under Article 46 in treaty law. 

The significance of the agreement not yet being in force

One of the most important legal details in the treaty text is often missed: under Article 6.6, the agreement enters into force only 60 days after the Parties exchange written notifications certifying completion of their applicable legal procedures, unless they decide otherwise. That means signature alone was not enough. There must also be completion of domestic legal procedures and an exchange of formal written notifications. 

This matters for Bangladesh because a challenge is generally easier before entry into force than after full implementation. If Bangladesh has not exchanged written notifications, then the State can argue that the agreement has not yet crossed the threshold into binding operational effect. In practical terms, that gives Dhaka more room to pause, review, or withdraw before domestic consequences deepen. It also reinforces the importance of the constitutional process under Article 145A. 

Withdrawal under the treaty itself

Even without relying on Article 62 or Article 46 of the VCLT, the agreement contains a plain-text exit route. Article 6.5allows either party to terminate by written notice, with termination taking effect 60 days later, unless both parties agree on another date. That is a clean contractual withdrawal mechanism. 

The complication is Article 6.4(2), which says that if the United States believes Bangladesh has not complied, the United States may reimpose the reciprocal tariff rate set out in Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 on certain or all imports from Bangladesh. A related clause in Article 4.3(4) also refers to termination and reimposition of that same reciprocal tariff if Bangladesh makes certain agreements with non-market countries. 

Here, Bangladesh has a fresh argument: the very tariff regime referenced in those clauses was later struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court when imposed under IEEPA, and CBP then halted collections under that regime. The United States may still impose tariffs under other legal authorities, but the specific reimposition threat written into the agreement now rests on a much shakier legal foundation than it did on 9 February 2026. That weakens the coercive force of the reimposition clauses, even if it does not eliminate all U.S. tariff leverage. 

A judicial route through the High Court Division

A parallel path is constitutional litigation. A writ petition before the High Court Division could ask for declarations that the agreement is unconstitutional, inoperative domestically, or incapable of legal effect unless and until the constitutional process is followed. Such a petition could be brought by an affected business body, trade association, public-interest organization, or citizen with sufficient standing, depending on how the pleadings are framed. This would be, at minimum, an arguable public-law challenge because the matter concerns constitutional compliance, treaty process, and national economic interests. 

The likely grounds would include:

■ violation of Article 25 by entering a trade arrangement incompatible with sovereignty, equality, and free economic choice;
■ non-compliance with Article 145A by failing to submit the treaty to the President and lay it before Parliament;
■ possible lack of constitutionally proper authority or “full powers” in the negotiators;
■ invalidity or at least reviewability because of a fundamental change in circumstances after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling; and
■ ultra vires action by an interim administration if it adopted a treaty-making pathway not recognized by the Constitution. 

What the government should do now

The strongest immediate step is not dramatic litigation. It is a formal constitutional review. The government should publicly clarify:

■ whether the treaty has been submitted to the President;
■ whether it has been laid before Parliament under Article 145A;
■ whether written notifications under Article 6.6 have been exchanged;
■ what instruments of authorization or full powers were issued to the Bangladeshi signatories; and
■ whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s tariff ruling has triggered a legal reassessment of Bangladesh’s obligations. 

If those answers are unsatisfactory, Bangladesh would have at least three legally supportable options: first, pause entry into force by withholding the required notification; second, serve termination notice under Article 6.5; third, defend a judicial review challenge in the High Court on constitutional and public-law grounds. The legal and political risks differ, but none of these options is fanciful on the present record. 

TRW Law Firm’s view

At Tahmidur Remura Wahid (TRW) Law Firm, our view is that the US–Bangladesh Reciprocal Trade Agreement is now vulnerable on two fronts at once: constitutional process and changed circumstances. The constitutional objections are likely the stronger domestic argument, especially if Article 145A was not followed. The treaty-law objections under the VCLT are more nuanced and would need to be framed carefully, because Article 62 is narrow and Article 46 requires a manifest violation of a rule of fundamental importance. Still, when combined with the agreement’s own 60-day termination mechanism and its pending entry-into-force structure, the legal case for reconsideration is substantial. 

Bangladesh does not need to accept the premise that a hurried bargain struck under tariff pressure must remain untouched after the legal basis of that pressure has changed. Nor should it assume that signature alone cures non-compliance with the Constitution. The better position is this: Bangladesh can still review, challenge, suspend, or terminate the agreement through lawful means. Whether it should do so is a matter of policy. Whether it may do so is now a serious legal question worthy of immediate action. 

Summary table

Issue	Key legal provision	Why it matters
Sovereignty and equality	Constitution, Article 25	Supports an argument that Bangladesh cannot constitutionally accept a treaty structure that undermines sovereign economic choice.
Executive authority	Constitution, Article 144	Confirms executive trade authority, but does not displace the separate constitutional treaty process.
Treaty process	Constitution, Article 145A	Requires treaties to be submitted to the President and laid before Parliament.
Authority of negotiators	VCLT Articles 7 and 8	Lack of valid full powers can undermine legal effect unless the State later confirms the act.
Violation of internal law	VCLT Article 46	A manifest violation of a rule of fundamental importance may be invoked against treaty validity.
Change in circumstances	VCLT Article 62	The post-signature collapse of Trump’s IEEPA tariff regime creates an arguable basis to reassess or withdraw.
Exit mechanism	Agreement, Article 6.5	Either party may terminate with 60 days’ written notice.
Entry into force	Agreement, Article 6.6	The treaty needs exchanged written notifications after completion of legal procedures.
Enforcement threat	Agreement, Articles 6.4 and 4.3(4)	Reimposition clauses refer back to the April 2025 reciprocal tariff regime, whose legal footing weakened after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling.